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T. S. ELIOT AND SALVADOR DALI:

SOME OBSERVATIONS CONCERNING SURREALISM AND THE OBJECTIVE CORRELATIVE

ANN DOROTHEA FERGUSON

> We shall not cease from exploration
> And the end of all our exploring
> Will be to arrive where we started
> And know the place for the first time.
> — T. S. Eliot: *Little Gidding*

In this age which has known the breaking-up of old traditions and the formation of new ones, which has inherited only the memory of utopian certainties, the search for pattern and form and order in its art seems doomed to hopeless confusion. The restlessness that resulted from real and threatened wars, from disillusionment and a preoccupation with time and change, and from complexity in every part of life has brought a tension into the arts which has expressed itself in a series of movements — impressionism, expressionism, cubism, symbolism, futurism, surrealism — and a host of eclectic combinations. The painter and the poet together face the dilemma of trying to create an art distinctly of the modern world, while yet unable to find any external order in twentieth century attitudes and events. It is precisely this dilemma which has driven the painter and the poet toward a parallel complexity of expression which in itself, at least, is representative.

It was Sir Joshua Reynolds, writing in the milieu of the eighteenth century neo-classical tradition, who said that "each art will corroborate and mutually reflect the truth of the other," and again, that "poetry addresses itself to the same faculties and the same dispositions as painting, though by different means."[1] The academic Reynolds, however, would also have said that "art has boundaries, though imagination has none," and have placed each art form in its own category, not to be confused with any other art form. It is not difficult, by way of illustration, to show in *Paradise Lost* the musical quality of Milton's blank verse, or to define the structure of his poetry, and show the powerful and recurring themes of heaven, hell, sin — at times one of them dominant, at others two themes moving together in counterpoint. *Paradise Lost* and the *B Minor Mass* of Bach express many of the same fundamental themes; both are eloquent and intelligible. The *Four Quartets* of T. S. Eliot will serve as a more modern illustration. But while it is one of the limiting laws of musical structure that it must express the abstract, in both painting and poetry it is possible to be much more individualized. Bach can voice human anguish in the *Kyrie* and aspiration

[1] Discourse XIII, *Enlightened England, An Anthology of Eighteenth Century Literature*, edited by Wylie Sypher. New York: 1947, p. 886.

in the *Sanctus,* but the poet or the painter can shape these abstracts into particular representations.

There has always been a definite boundary between the two art forms of painting and poetry. The imaginative process that produces a great painting has gone on in the mind of the artist, before or while he paints, and needs only to be apprehended and the intentions of the artist filled in by the imagination of the viewer; the basic ideas have been given. Until a few decades ago, we could have said that the experience of the viewer, combined with his intellectual apprehension, would give him understanding.

The case has not been so with poetry. The pictures provided by the poet have had to be reconstructed from verbal symbols, out of a pattern of imagery, form, rhythm, design and motif, by the imagination of the reader. But poetry has gone beyond the boundaries allowed the painter, in that it can provide not only the picture, but idea, argument, explanation and meaning. Through long tradition poetry has had at its command not only the power to create images and provide rich musical structure, but also to communicate directly to the reader. It is peculiar to the twentieth century that the communication has become obscured, and the boundaries between art and music and poetry have become blurred — that poetry has sought to give image only, without the communication, that painting has become a "tonal harmony of color," and that the three art forms appear to have lost their identities in the search for the distinctly modern form.

Emerging from the confusion of the search have come, happily, several voices which seem to have apprehended and interpreted, if not resolved, the twentieth century dilemma. One of them is that of T. S. Eliot, acknowledged as a leading influence on the direction poetry has taken in the last thirty years. Another voice comes from the controversial figure of Salvador Dali, surrealist painter. Perhaps there are no two any further apart in theory than these, for Eliot bases his work on a very rational, intellectual impersonal thesis, while Dali's art is the product of an attempt at the completely irrational — the very personal, subjective, subconscious world of dreams.

It was Eliot, in his essay "The Metaphysical Poets," who said,

> Our civilization comprehends great variety and complexity, and this variety and complexity, playing upon a refined sensibility, must produce various and complex results. The poet must become more and more comprehensive, more allusive, more indirect, in order to force, to dislocate if necessary, language into his meaning.[2]

In this, Eliot has given the apologetic of the modern school, and crystallized for us the method and technique which poets and painters are having to use. The diction of another age of poets, and the likenesses of other artists are insufficient to stand as representative of the state of the twentieth century.

[2] T. S. Eliot, *Selected Essays.* New York: 1950, p. 248.

It is particularly that concept of "forcing or dislocating" language which is important in the consideration of this paper.

A major premise in accepting any new form in the arts is that art itself is dynamic and changing, and that traditional treatments no longer have a meaning in relation to the present. Another type of sensibility produced a Milton or a Tennyson, a Gainsborough or a Constable. Eliot and Dali both are concerned with forcing language and meaning out of former molds, with dislocating it in order to form something much closer to modern sensibilities. So, then, it becomes the task of the critics to unfold the new diction and the new techniques.

Perhaps some of the most famous lines in all of Eliot are found in "The Love Song of J. Alfred Prufrock," in which the poet startles us by saying

> Let us go then, you and I,
> When the evening is spread out against the sky
> Like a patient etherised upon a table.

We are not used to having these two concepts put together in this way. But it is precisely this juxtaposition which tells more clearly than many paragraphs of explanation just what Eliot intends. All the shades of meaning that can be connected with a hospital patient etherised upon the table are present here, and by sharp juxtaposition each of these meanings is dislocated, and transferred to the image of the evening spread out against the sky. All the nineteenth century poetic language available could not serve to show how unconscious, half-dead, half-alive is the quality not only of the evening, but of the people who are moving about in the rest of the poem. Such a view of the world would itself have been incomprehensible to a nineteenth century mind. A stanza, written in the 1890's, handles a comparable setting:

> Softly the stealthy night descends,
> The black sails fade into the sky.
> Is not this, where the sea-line ends,
> The shore-line of infinity?[3]

The verses are uncomplicated by any meaning not inherent in the words themselves. The words are expected, pleasant to hear, and the thought is also led safely along abstract questions, with no harsh and concrete images to disturb the reader, or give him a new awareness of real things.

Eliot's lines give us the setting for Prufrock, who has been only vaguely aware of a vision of reality beyond his "etherised" existence. We are prepared for the question, "Do I dare disturb the universe?" which Prufrock asks of himself, and for the series of images, all connected with ordinary things, but all heightened by dislocated meanings.

[3] Arthur Symons, "On the Beach," *The Victorian Age*, edited by John Wilson Bowyer and John Lee Brooks. New York: 1938.

And I have known the eyes already, known them all —
The eyes that fix you in a formulated phrase,
And when I am formulated, sprawling on a pin,
When I am pinned and wriggling on the wall,
Then how should I begin
To spit out all the butt-ends of my days and ways?

It is only a few lines later on that Prufrock makes his conclusion — two lines followed by a third which seems innocent enough until we recall the ether image at the beginning of the poem.

I should have been a pair of ragged claws
Scuttling across the floors of silent seas.

. . . . .

And the afternoon, the evening, sleeps peacefully!

Throughout the poem Eliot has enlarged upon and expanded this quality, so that we are prepared also for the final line, "Till human voices wake us, and we drown."

Again, Eliot best explains exactly what he had in mind in using this technique. "There are no images of feeling," Fairchild has said,[4] and Eliot, working from this idea, writes,

> The only way of expressing emotion in the form of art is by finding an "objective correlative"; in other words, a set of objects, a situation, a chain of events which shall be the formula of that particular emotion; such that when the external facts, which must terminate in sensory experience, are given, the emotion is immediately evoked. If you examine any of Shakespeare's more successful tragedies, you will find this exact equivalence; you will find that the state of mind of Lady Macbeth walking in her sleep has been communicated to you by a skilful accumulation of imagined sensory impressions; the words of Macbeth on hearing of his wife's death strikes us as if, given the sequence of events, these words were automatically released by the last event in the series.[5]

This is what Eliot has done with Prufrock, not in a dramatic situation, but in a detached intellectual observation, using a series of objective correlatives to evoke the feeling he intended when he wrote "Till human voices wake us, and we drown."

On a much larger scope and in a much more complex sense, Eliot successfully worked out *The Wasteland* as an objective correlative. It is not necessary here to repeat the excellent analyses of the poem which have been made in recent years,[6] for our purpose can be served by noting how complicated and interdependent are the parts of the structure of the poem. The myth is, of course, basically that of the Fisher King and the curse upon his land which turned it into a wasteland.[7] The myth is not static, however, nor is it used as allegory, but it constantly changes, never losing its original

4 Arthur H. R. Fairchild, in *The Critic's Notebook,* edited by Robert Wooster Stallman. Minneapolis: 1950, p. 118.
5 Eliot, "Hamlet," in *Selected Essays,* pp. 124-125. New York: 1950.
6 The analysis of Professor Cleanth Brooks is particularly fine.
7 Eliot's source is Miss Jessie Weston's study of the myth, *From Ritual to Romance.*

meaning but always becoming richer by absorbing each new idea. The myth of the Fisher King becomes interlocked with the story of the search for the Holy Grail, and the Chapel Perilous, and then with the Christian concept of the death of Christ.

> After the torchlight red on sweaty faces
> After the frosty silence in the gardens
> After the agony in stony places
> The shouting and the crying
> Prison and palace and reverberation
> Of thunder of spring over distant mountains
> He who was living is now dead . . . .

The setting of the Wasteland itself is both London and the Wasteland, as well as the modern world in a universal sense.

The narrative is difficult to follow, but Eliot meant it to be so. But it is significant that most readers, even lacking the knowledge and erudition which elucidates all the symbols and the obscure literary and Scriptural allusions, get from the very rhythm and design and language of the poem with all its images, at least part of the idea and feeling of the poem. It has been said that in this poem Eliot found not only objective correlatives for individual images, but one grand objective correlative for the whole state of the twentieth century. Certainly it is not a pleasant poem, but it has characterized, as no other method could have done, the wasteland experience of Eliot personally and of London and of the world.

C. L. Barber, in an essay on *The Family Reunion,* has noted how necessary the relation between object and idea (feeling) is, by pointing out the failure of the Eumenides symbol in the play to take on a "hard core of meaning."

> What is fatal for an artist is to use irrational symbolic significance without making it a part of a socially meaningful action, without drawing it up into the regions of life men have in common. In so far as a writer does this, his production is really asocial, like a dream — a work of fantasy rather than a work of art. The decay of religious tradition — the lack of forms at once symbolic and social — has of late led inward writers in this asocial direction, under such banners as that of Surrealism. I think that in *The Family Reunion* Eliot has gone the same way in spite of his concern for orthodoxy, and that this has happened because, to use his own terms, there was no living tradition or social "way of feeling and acting" about the Eumenides to help control their irrational significance.[8]

The Family Reunion lacks exactly that which made *The Wasteland* rich — meaning. The Eumenides (symbol of a curse upon Harry's father, and the sense of guilt which follows Harry) lead us to this conclusion:

> Mary: A curse is written
> On the under side of things
> Behind the smiling mirror
> And behind the smiling moon
> Follow follow

[8] C. L. Barber, *Strange Gods at T. S. Eliot's "The Family Reunion,"* in *T. S. Eliot: A Selected Critque,* ed. Leonard Unger, p. 418.

Agatha: This way the pilgrimage
Of expiation
Round and round the circle
Completing the charm
So the knot be unkotted
The cross be uncrossed
The crooked be made straight
And the curse be ended . . . .[9]

The lines are full of oblique allusion, but are never crystallized for us. Like a Dali painting, they have a ritual-like quality, as of magic or enchantment, but they do not leave satisfyingly clear picture that concludes *The Wasteland.*

I sat upon the shore
Fishing, with the arid plain behind me
Shall I at least set my lands in order?
London Bridge is falling down falling down falling down
. . . . . .
These fragments I have shored against my ruins.[10]

Barber has mentioned the surrealist movement. The principle behind this is not limited to Dali, or even to painting, but the name of Dali has become synonymous with the term, and at any rate he is a good representative of the form, technique and achievement of the movement. For a definition of surrealism, I shall quote Herbert Read.

> Surrealism . . . is a mode of emotional expression (as opposed to the mode of intellectual vision [Eliot] . . .). Dali has declared that the time is now at hand for what he calls the systematization of confusion, the total discrediting of the world of reality. This is to be achieved by a reliance on the illogical and unpredictable nature of dream-imagery.[11]

The thing that makes surrealism so interesting is not its aim alone, but the methods and techniques which Dali uses. Here we can see a parallel to what Eliot does in poetry — the careful detail, exactness, and polished verisimilitude of the objects painted. The difference, however, is basic. While Eliot forces new meaning into objects by dislocating them, Dali strives to select objects — real or fancied — which have no possible or logical relation to each other.

> He will seek to bring about the most unexpected, the most shocking and awe-inspiring encounters between contrary images, — juxtapositions 'as beautiful as the unexpected meeting, on a dissecting table, of a sewing-machine and an umbrella.'[12]

Beyond this irrationality, several qualities seem to be present in most of Dali's work: the frequent elimination of a horizon — but with a heightened perspective which gives a feeling of infinity to the painting; the strong

[9] These are the last two speeches of the play, and illustrate what Barber means by a symbol that is a vacuum, surrounded by concrete and objective meaning, but itself meaningless.

[10] It is in these concluding lines that "I" becomes Tirèsias, symbol of modern consciousness, merged with the Fisher King. These lines fulfill all the objective images, gathering together all the levels of meaning which they have encompassed.

[11] Herbert Read, *Art Now.* London: 1948, pp. 86, 89.

[12] *Ibid.*, p. 87.

light which floods his pictures; the peculiar combination of hard edges with muted, dreamy tones of color, always very clear, and nearly always cold. Design, in itself a rationale, underlies the arrangement of the patterns of objects that he paints. The perspective which he uses to show depth is often divided, so that one painting appears to have two or more different perspectives at play in it. It is almost as if the two contradictory states of being — reality and dream — are striving to be resolved. Dali felt that the subconscious was an absolute reality, beyond anything the conscious mind could know, and in his early work, with its discrediting of reason, there is evident all of the cynicism and irony that could be connected with the decay and disintegration of civilization theme which occupies Eliot.

After several years of painting strictly from the subconscious world of dreams, with a Freudian emphasis, Dali has left his completely irrational designs to paint intelligible pictures which possess recognizable subject matter. His treatment is the same. There is often the double perspective, and his light and color and space are not lost. A recent example is his painting *Christ of St. John of the Cross* which hangs in the Glasgow Art Gallery and Museum. Oddly enough, the subject, taken from the writings of the Spanish mystic of the sixteenth century, is the same source which Eliot used in *Ash Wednesday.*

The method Eliot used in making poetry is peculiarly suited to the twentieth century, and Dali has in many respects developed the same method in art, though with a different goal in mind. Eliot, who seemingly used a pastiche — helter-skelter images and allusions — has actually drawn together many abstracts and imposed a new form and a new meaning, a meaning in which the specific words and lines throw light upon his subject, but do not stand alone beside it. Dali's images, in a real sense helter-skelter, have the opposite effect.

Is it other than possible, in an age of the breaking-up of traditions and the search for significant new forms, that the search should take many paths, or that their bases should be so parallel? Each of these men is working with a definite method, that of transforming and dislocating meaning, by a juxtaposition and formation of objective correlatives. In *Modern Poetry and the Christian Tradition,* Amos Wilder remarks the decay of civilization, but notes further that *"much of the disintegration is desirable,"* if the state of it is not.[13] The twentieth century has given us a wasteland and the times are rootless, dry, and tragic. Eliot and Dali have, to a large extent, written and painted in the only way possible, and what they reveal is not, as we are so apt to say hastily, a chaotic picture of this century, but a segment in the

[13]Amos N. Wilder, *Modern Poetry and the Christian Tradition.* New York: 1952, p. 59.

ordered search for design and pattern which will become acceptable in a new tradition, and which will be as valid as the old traditions once were.

As Eliot has written, this century has been, and must contiune to be, one of exploration — not to find *new* truth, but to explore the same truth — for Eliot would agree that the Christianity he uses, e.g., in *Ash Wednesday,* is both valid and more acceptable in twentieth century language. But it has become a necessity to change technique in order to achieve the same results. Abstract art and poetry can be the way through which all truth can

> . . . arrive where we started
> And know the place for the first time.

THE ONTOLOGICAL WITNESS

JOHN F. GATES

The existence of the self-revealing, self-sustaining, personal, sovereign, triune God is the foremost postulate of the entire Bible. To call upon a person in Biblical days to offer cold, logical demonstration as to the existence of One with whom he as an individual held frequent conversation and communion would have appeared as a most strange and even irrational demand. The psychology pervading the mind of the Semite, in general, and of the Hebrew in particular, is antithetical to the categories of philosophical abstraction. The nearest approach in Biblical literature to the Greek concept of speculative reasoning is beyond doubt the Book of Ecclesiastes. As a matter of record, as outstanding a scholar as Edward J. Young denies the Solomonic authorship of the Book because of its supposed affiliation with the Mishna. The main point of interest is, however, to observe that even in this somewhat unusual Book of Ecclesiastes, "Koheleth" does not attempt to set forth any argument as to the existence of the Supreme Being, but simply urges his reader to "remember thy Creator in the days of thy youth." The book may and does philosophize about life but never about God.

It is to Aristotle that the credit (or perchance blame) for the evolving of the first elaborated proof of God's existence, *qua* the unmoved Mover, belongs. It is assumed that the reader of the present article is well enough acquainted with this phase of the Aristotelian formula not to demand repetition.

In the train of Aristotle, Thomas Aquinas, the "Angelic Doctor," brought about the great ontological shift when he transferred the foundations of apologetics from a moderate rationalism to a moderate realism. Taking the concept of motion as his interpretive key, Aquinas proceeds to construct upon Aristotelian premises the glittering, astounding superstructure of a

fideism, having the philosophical abstraction of a contemplative thinker as its rock formation, but with its high tower pointing ever upwards to the one true God whose very name is being. Thus, according to Burtt, the most outstanding accomplishment of Thomism was to "Aristotelianize Christianity and to Christianize Aristotle."[1]

It may be recalled that the names usually assigned to these arguments are: the argument from motion, from efficient causation, from possibility and necessity, from gradation, and from governance of the world. The feudalistic character of these empirical contentions is not difficult to observe. The serf owned allegiance to his lord, the lord to the king, the king to the bishop and the pope, and the pope directly to God, whose vicar he considered himself to be. The balance of power was neatly distributed. God was in heaven; the pope was enthroned in Rome, the "Babylonian Captivity" notwithstanding; the lord was in the castle; the king upon the seat of civil authority, the serf was on the manor. What could be more orderly and peaceful?

With the breakup of feudalism, and the slow dawn of industrialism, however, this type of philosophic speculation became suspect, until in Britain it reached its climax in the thinking of Hume, who proclaimed in the arid desert of empiricism the absence of connection between cause and effect. Kant was also to wheel up his engines of war to blast against the bastions of metaphysics as he considered God "within the confines of the reason alone."

As these types of objections to the attempt of philosophy in the name of, and for the sake of, the Christian faith, to "prove" the existence of a Supreme Being who even remotely resembled the God of revelation continued to make themselves felt, the Reformed theologians increasingly turned away from them, while the Romanistic writers continued to espouse the same, in typical humanistic fashion. Luther in perhaps an overstatement of emphasis can not find so much as a "single line in all the writings of Aristotle worth the reading."[2] Calvin is more judicious, but scarcely more charitable in his judgment. The Geneva theologian styles the Aristotelian proofs as the "frigid dogma of Aristotle [which] destroys the immortality of the soul, and deprives God of His rights."[3]

It is not until quite recent years, however, that the implications of a Reformed system of apologetics have begun to be appreciated. The long exile of St. Augustine has, lamentably, been not merely on the part of the Roman Catholic Church, but on the part of evangelical Protestantism as well. The ontological proof which was formulated by St. Anselm has, in reality,

1 Edwin A. Burtt, *Types of Religious Philosophy,* New York: Harper & Brothers, 1939.
2 Merle D'Aubigne, *The Life and Times of Martin Luther,* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1954.
3 John Calvin, *Institutes of the Christian Religion,* Phila.: Presbyterian Board of Education, Vol. I, p. 67.

been anticipated by the African Bishop in his illustration of the ring. In his *De Trinitatis,* Augustine tells us that the Creator has placed a stamp or seal upon the "soft substance" of man's being (his soul), such an impression being knowledge.[4] This opens the way for the doctrine of divine illumination. Knowledge whether sacred or secular is of a derivative character. All truth is of divine origin. Augustinian epistemology is theistically oriented.

It is a slight transference from this — the thought of the Bishop of Hippo outlined in bold relief in an innate ontology — to the expression of the ontological proof as voiced by the Bishop of Canterbury (1033-1109 A.D.). The principal difficulty is that the *form* of the argument is capable of many and varied (even slightly contradictory) expressions. Are we to call it an argument from *being,* from *perfection,* or an argument from *perfect formal being?* This must largely remain a matter of interpretation. For the sake of a univocal emphasis, we shall settle upon the last stated for the purposes of this article. For be it remembered that the ontological argument, though capable of being couched in philosophical terms, is not primarily a philosophical argument, but a theological one.

The very "non-existence" of God, the Anselmic argument is certain, is an "unthinkable thought." This does not imply, to be sure, that certain men have not denied and do not yet deny God's existence. But the point is that such a denial constitutes an essential surrender, and even betrayal, of man's rationality. This to Anselm is the meaning of the psalmist when he says, "The fool hath said in his heart there is no God." He who questions his filiation on the grounds of lack of proof would be considered a monster; so likewise must he be judged who denies the most essential relationship of all of life, which is to God.

The ontological proof is not to be confused with William Ernest Hocking's idea of the "will as a maker of truth." It appears that Hocking thinks that the ontology of God is dependent to a large degree upon the cognitive permission of the human mind.[5] He urges that the mind of the occidental does not possess the capacity of "poetic insight" as does the oriental. This charge may be true enough generally speaking, but it is scarcely germane here.

To return to the ontological argument proper, it must be granted that it reflects the Platonic conception of the independent existence of the Ideal World, up to a certain point. As Bavinck expresses it: "The ontological proof deduces God's actual existence from His necessary existence in thought."[6]

[4] Aurelius Augustine, *De Trinitatis* (Marcus Dodds, tr.), Edinburgh: T & T Clark, n.d., Bk 14, Ch. 15, Sec 21.

[5] Wm. Ernest Hocking, "The Will as a Maker of Truth," from *Approaches to Philosophy of Religion,* New York: Prentice Hall Inc., p. 17 ff.

[6] Herman Bavinck, *The Doctrine of God,* Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1955, p. 72.

According to this writer, the argument is capable of being expressed in three ways:

(1) From the general ideas and norms present in the human mind, i.e., from that reason which transcends both our individual reason and that of the entire world, it concludes absolute reason: the sum-total of all these ideas and norms, absolute truth, goodness, and beauty, i.e., God. (Plato, Augustine, Boethius, Anselm in his *Monologium*).

(2) Or, it derives the real existence of the highest, absolute idea (i.e., God) from the necessary presence of that idea in thought; as otherwise it would not be the highest idea, the absolute idea, inasmuch as an idea which has real existence is greater and higher than one not having real existence (Anselm, *Proslogium*).

(3) Or, it proves God's existence from the innate charcter of the idea of God (Descartes).[7]

It is not that the world of ideas is on a par or level with God, after the fashion of Plato, much less that it transcends Him, as is suggested by Whitehead, but rather that they are rooted in contingency dependent and depending on the Being by whose mind they themselves have been called into being. Thus the claim that the chasm between thought and Being can not be bridged is not really substantiated. Just as for a man to say, "The universe has no meaning," requires that it possess some meaning — or else he could not say so with significance. Likewise, for a man to venture the proposition, "There is no God," also requires (for him) an unwelcome, lurking suspicion that there is such. "My father will not punish me," arrogantly boasts the disobedient child as he fearfully trudges home to certain retribution.

According to Anselm, existence is an attribute of perfection. God's very non-existence is a thought repugnant to the reason. Man has to be schooled and disciplined in atheism. If Anselm were alive today, he could find ample illustration of his premise in the dialectical materialism of Karl Marx.

By this latter we are not to understand anything like the older liberalistic teaching of the natural, inherent goodness of man apart from redemptive grace. Rather than to identify the Anselmic doctrine with any such thought, it is much more to the point to ground it in the doctrine of man as created *Imago Dei.* Man bears the divine image, surely not physically, but mentally, morally, socially and above all, spiritually. "God is Spirit."[8] This is the teaching, not of a mere philosopher, but of Christ, the incarnate Wisdom of God. If, as according to Christ the essence of God is pure spirituality, then man must bear within his innermost nature the sign and seal of the existence of his creator, even though both by life and word of mouth he may rebelliously deny it.

Nor are we to be understood as stating that man, as a sinner, retains

[7] *Op. cit. in loco.*

[8] John 4:24. The anarthrous use of the noun, *pneuma,* should be carefully observed in this text.

the clear and distinct ontological concept that was his as he issued forth pure from his creator in the day of his creation. We wish to pay full justice to the doctrine of the noetic effects of the Fall upon man. We may never know, at least in this life, the terrible mental, as well as moral consequences of man's initial act of disobedience. But we do argue that if the forfeiture of the divine image had been part of the penalty imposed, man would have ceased to be amenable to God's saving grace in Jesus Christ. This is not the case.

Nor are we to be understood to be pleading for anything like an undue subjectivism. Certainly this would be a most illegitimate usage of the ontological approach. The innate capacity of man is not the producer of something (in this case, the notion of the idea of God's existence) but is the receptive faculty of the same. This is, to be sure, in opposition to the Thomistic conception of *tabula rasa,* the theory that states that the mind is like a blank piece of paper at birth. The Thomists can not very well allow for an ontology of innateness, following as they do the philosophic dogma of Aristotelian empiricism. The falsity of grounding any type of knowledge upon sense-perception should be apparent because of the bad habit such a technique has of becoming involved in the toils of skepticism.

It may be well to consider a few of the objections raised against the ontological proof. In Anselm's own time a monk by the name of Gaunilo contended that a concept in the mind does not really imply objective existence. He employed the illustration of an imagined, perfect island and then posed the question as to whether just because such an island could be mentally conceived it must of necessity exist? Anselm responded that the analogy was not relevant, or to the point. He claimed that since the existence of the perfect island in the middle of the ocean is a contingent idea, whereas the existence of God is a necessary one, they are not at all in the same category.[9] In short, he declared that when we think of the greatest Being, we necessarily think of God.

Essentially, Kant was to make the same charge against this type of argument by his criticism that though the human mind might indeed have an idea of God, it could not and did not contain an infinitely perfect idea since the human mind that was thinking it was obviously not a perfect or infinite mind. He asks the question if he thinks that he has a thousand German guilders in his pocket, does he actually have such a sum of money? If the response to the illustration is in the negative, the reply to the argument itself must be a negative one. However, the original answer of Anselm to Guanilo is just as meaningful in this connection. Kant's argument is after the

9 Frederick Mayer, *A History of Ancient and Medieval Philosophy,* New York: American Book Co., 1951, p. 385 f.

fashion of contingency; Gaunilo's argument is likewise modeled after the pattern of the conception of the dependent. The "Antinomies" of Kant preclude, under their prohibitive strictures on epistemology, the very idea of the ontological proof for God's existence. Kant, as is well-known, demanded that morals be substituted for metaphysics. His entire, heavy, cumbersome structure appeals at its heart to moral or ethical foundations.[10] Theoretical inquiry may well serve or tend to lead us away from a belief in God, Kant avers; while practical knowledge as it is grounded in the ethical realm can only tend to call us back to the initial premise of a conviction of the existence of God as the sustainer of moral values.

> By reconciling in this way religion and science, Kant radically transformed theology. From being a kind of metaphysical knowledge, it became morally grounded, and a faith whose essential value is to clarify, support and enrich our moral life.[11]

What Kant failed to see, however, was that the moral self becomes, in its wake, a metaphysical principle. Kant still must go beyond the confines of the material universe, vast though it may be, to make sense out of reality. There is no such thing, after all, as "religion" within the confines or limits of the reason alone.

Basically, the ontological proof may be summarized by dividing it into two parts, a major and minor premise:

> God is that than which no greater thought can be thought:
> But that than which no greater thought can be thought, must exist not only mentally in idea, but also extramentally.
> *The Major Premiss* simply gives us the idea of God, the idea which a man has of God, even if he denies His existence.
> *The Minor Premiss* is clear, since if that than which no greater can be thought existed only in the mind, it would not be that than which no greater can be thought. A greater could be thought, i.e. a being that existed in extramental reality as well as in idea.[12]

The conclusion, therefore, although for some reason Copleston does not give it, would seem to be: Ergo, God has bona fide existence outside our minds.

It seems that if the ontological argument be not considered as at least feasible, the whole fabric of Pauline theology, and thereby much of the teaching of the New Testament, collapses. Speaking of the depraved, benighted condition of the heathen, the Apostle to the Gentiles writes:

> For although they knew God they did not honour him as God . . . Claiming to be wise, they became fools, and exchanged the glory of the immortal God for images resembling mortal man or birds or animals or reptiles.[13]

[10]Immanuel Kant, *Critique of the Practical Reason and Other Writings in Moral Philosophy,* Chicago: University Press, 1949, p. 228.
[11]Edwin Burtt, *Types of Religious Philosophy* (Revised ed.), New York: Harper Bros., 1951, p. 226.
[12]Frederick Copleston, *A History of Philosophy,* Westminster, Maryland: The Newman Press, 1952, Vol. II, p. 162.
[13]Romans 1:21-23 (RSV).

Again, it is stated *in loco* that "they did not see fit to retain God in their knowledge" (v. 28). The indictment of Paul — nay, of God — against the heathen is that, once having known Him, in the capacity of the creator, they deliberately turned their back, closed their eyes, and stopped their ears in regard to the knowledge of God, in the vain hope that they would thus no longer be accountable to Him, so bringing upon themselves the uttermost of the righteous wrath of God.[14]

Now, one can never, or at least should never consider the thought of the judgment of a righteous God, without taking into account the conception of the salvation of a merciful God, even as Paul gives us example and precedent in the Book of Romans.[15]

Unless there is in the depths of man's being a supra-sensible, immediate cognition of the divine being, the revelation of God in nature, in Christ, or in the Holy Scripture has no genuine significance. The divine imprimatur placed by the Creator in the creation upon the soul of man affords the point of contact, the meeting-place, the *Grundschrift* of self-disclosure on the part of God to man.

The primacy and validity of the ontological proof is seen in that it enables man, as quickened by the Holy Spirit, to answer God's age-old question, "Adam, where art thou?"

[14]See Romans 2:9 ff.
[15]Romans 3:21-23; 4:21-25; 5:1-5, 15-17; 6:23, etc.

DONNE AND THE ANGELS' TRUMPETS:*

A RENAISSANCE TREATMENT OF THE RESURRECTION OF THE BODY

CHARLES A. HUTTAR

John Donne, the Dean of St. Paul's, is remembered as a poet rather than as a systematic theologian. The reader will recall that Donne was born a papist about 1572, received his youthful instruction from the Jesuits who were still carrying on their clandestine activities in England, and not until early in the seventeenth century embraced the Protestant faith. In 1615 he was ordained an Anglican priest, and in 1621 became Dean of St. Paul's Cathedral in London, at which post he remained until his death in 1631. His early and extensive training in Scholastic thought and the tension aroused by his conflict between Romanism and Anglicanism had lasting effects on his poetry and his other writings.

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The 160 sermons which have survived give ample evidence that throughout his work his essential attitude was always that of the poet. He did not expound a systematic theology, but was inclined to repeat over and over again a few doctrines. If a Scholastic argument, or a passage from the Fathers, offered itself in support or explanation of his teaching, he used it, and so we get in the *Sermons* an appearance of a well documented and thoroughly reasoned out theology. But behind all of Donne's works there are a few main themes, and there can be no doubt that these were the ideas which strongly gripped his imagination.

The idea of immortality was one of these. The immortality of the soul has "so many evidences," says Donne,[1] that it does not even need to be included in the Creed, in order to be believed! The reality of this idea for him is shown, for example, by the passage in *The second Anniversarie* which describes the flight of Elizabeth Drury's soul from her body to heaven.

Just as real to him was the resurrection of the body, even though this idea is not accessible to reason but must be implanted by faith before it can be defended by reason.[1] His biographer Izaak Walton tells us that in his last will Donne affirmed his faith in the resurrection. His poetry contains numerous casual references to the fact of the resurrection,[2] such as could only come naturally out of a deep-seated personal belief.

This insistence on the immortality of the body as well as the soul is in perfect keeping with an emphasis which we find throughout Donne. Much of the love poetry in the *Songs and Sonnets* is a rather violent expression of the claims of the body, as opposed to those of the soul; but *The Extasie* is justly famous as a statement probably quite close to Donne's real position:

> Loves mysteries in soules doe grow,
> But yet the body is his booke.

Through Donne's other works we are constantly reminded of his assertion of the body. We have it in Paradox XI of *Juvenilia,* "That the Gifts of the Body Are Better than Those of the Minde," in Prayer XX of the *Devotions,* and even in *The Litanie* ll. 143-144):

> From thinking us all soul,e neglecting thus
> Our mutual duties, Lord deliver us.

I have dwelt at length on these passages which show Donne's insistence on the dignity of the body, because they offer us a clue as to why this particular doctrine of the resurrection of the body was a favorite one with him.

Certainly the idea of the body's being allowed to live eternally alongside God provided him with some of his most eloquent passages:

1 No. 1 in *Fifty Sermons;* Alford, IV, 4. (See bibliographical note at end.)
2 As *The Relique,* 7-11; *To the Countesse of Bedford* ("T'have written then"), 57; *The second Anniversarie,* 59-60.

> And therefore be content to wonder at this, That God would have such a care to dignifie, and to crown, and to associate to his own everlasting presence, the body of man. . . . That this clod of earth, this body of ours should be carried up to the highest heaven, placed in the eye of God, set down at the right hand of God, . . . wonder at this.[3]

He goes on to prove by the inbreathing of God's spirit at Creation, by the Incarnation, and by the fact that men's bodies are the Temple of the Holy Ghost, how each Person of the Trinity has asserted the dignity of the human body. His argument for the resurrection is reasoned along this line:

> God made the first Marriage, and man made the first Divorce; God married the Body and Soule in the Creation, and man divorced the Body and Soule by death through sinne, in his fall. . . . As farre as man is immortall, man is a married man still, still in possession of a soule, and a body too. . . .[4]
> . . . All that is falne, receives a resurrection; . . . that is, . . . the whole man. . . . A man is not saved, a sinner is not redeemed, I am not received into heaven, if my body be left out; The soule and the body concurred to the making of a sinner, and body and soule must concur to the making of a Saint.[5]

Donne expresses this idea poetically in the *Elegie on M[ist]ris Boulstred* (ll. 41-45):

> As houses fall not, though the King remove,
> Bodies of Saints rest for their soules above.
> Death gets 'twixt soules and bodies such a place
> As sinne insinuates 'twixt just men and grace,
> Both work a separation, no divorce.

And in *The second Anniversarie* he alludes to the resurrection, in terms of this marital image, as one of the joys which are the lot of the soul in heaven (ll. 491-2):

> Joy that their last great Consummation
> Approaches in the resurrection.

Of the element of predestination which is implied in this teaching of the resurrection as fulfillment of the marriage which was intended from the beginning, Donne was fully aware. In fact, in one of his funeral sermons he relishes this idea too, carrying it out to its ultimate conclusion:

> They that are not faln yet by any actuall sinne, (children newly baptized) are risen already in him; and they that are not dead yet, nay, not alive yet, not yet borne, have a Resurrection in him, who was not onely the Lambe *slaine* from the beginning, but from before all beginnings was *risen* too; and all that shall ever have part in the second Resurrection, are risen with him from that time.[6]

Donne takes from one of the Church Fathers the statement that the resurrection is a restoration of something which has fallen. Of this the restoration of the body to union with the soul (after the *Casus in separa-*

[3] No. 20 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VI, 265. (See bibliographical note at end.)
[4] No. 80 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 257.
[5] No. 21 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 103. The same idea of "a full consummation, and reuniting of body and soul" is expressed in the sermon preached at the churching of the Countess of Bridgewater; Alford, IV, 165.
[6] No. 80 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 258.

tionem, which is "naturall death") is but one element. He also recognizes other "falls": *Casus in dissolutionem,* the decay of the body in the grave, and *Casus in dispersionem,* the scattering of man's dust "upon the face of the earth."[7]

That the decay of the body was vivid in Donne's imagination cannot be disputed by anyone who has read his last sermon, *Deaths Duell,* which is only one of myriad references to this gruesome subject. I have selected only those quotations which bear directly on the resurrection of the body after, and in spite of, this putrefaction. *The second Anniversarie* ll. 115-118) contains a mild expression of the idea, in such a context of faith in the resurrection:

> Thinke that thy body rots, and (if so low,
> Thy soule exalted so, thy thoughts can goe,)
> Thinke thee a Prince, who of themselves create
> Wormes which insensibly devoure their State.[8]

It is unthinkable for Donne that this decay should be the final end of the body. "As soon shall God tear a leaf out of the Book of Life," he says, "and cast so many of the Elect into Hell fire, as leave the body of any of his Saints in corruption for ever."[9] On the contrary, Donne says explicitly, "The dead body falls . . . into atoms and graines of dust; . . . God shall re-compact and re-compile those atoms and graines of dust, into that Body, which was before."[10] This promise of reconstruction is somehow implicit in death itself. ". . . As West and East /. . . are one,/ So death doth touch the Resurrection."[11] In fact, "the Funerall is the Easter-eve, The Buriall is the depositing of . . . man for the Resurrection."[12] Donne takes up this idea and deals with it by means of a number of different images — which again is proof of the interest it held for him.

> But must wee say she's dead? may't not be said
> That as a sundred clocke is peecemeale laid,
> Not to be lost, but by the makers hand
> Repollish'd, without error then to stand,
> Or as the Affrique Niger streame enwombs
> It selfe into the earth, and after comes
> (Having first made a naturall bridge, to passe
> For many leagues) farre greater than it was,
> May't not be said, that her grave shall restore
> Her, greater, purer, firmer, than before?[13]

[7] See No. 21 in *LXXX Sermons; loc. cit.*
[8] Other examples in the sermons of this vein include No. 80 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 272.
[9] No. 21 in *XXVI Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VI, 363.
[10] No. 21 in *LXXX Sermons; loc. cit.*
[11] *Hymne to God my God, in my sicknesse,* 13-15. Mrs. Simpson, in "Donne's Sermons and Their Relation to His Poetry," *Modern Language Review,* VII (1912), 45-46, points out a parallel passage from one of the Easter sermons and suggests this may be a possible source for the "South-west discoverie" image in l. 9.
[12] No. 80 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 273.
[13] *A Funerall Elegie,* 37-46.

> The Resurrection then, being the Coronation of man, his Death, and lying downe in the grave, is his enthroning, his sitting downe in that chayre, where he is to receive that Crowne.[14]

When Donne speaks of the body's resurrection, as is clear from these quotations, there is firmly fixed in his mind the traditional Christian doctrine that the resurrected body is an improvement over that of earthly life. For the Scriptural sources for this teaching reference must certainly be made to I Corinthians 15, which was a favorite text of Donne as a preacher. Here we are told that the body "is sown in corruption; it is raised in incorruption; . . . it is sown a natural body; it is raised a spiritual body. . . . We shall all be changed." Thus in the passage from *A Funerall Elegie,* Donne says that Elizabeth Drury's body will be "greater, purer, firmer, than before." He utilizes this idea to pay the Countess of Bedford the labored compliment that she is already made of purer stuff than most mortals, and "such as needs small change at the last day."[15] As to the exact nature of the glorified body Donne elaborates at some length, but his statements are metaphorical and typically vague from the theologian's point of view. In the *Resurrection* sonnet, for instance, he tells us that the body becomes "that . . . of which, and for which 'twas;" which is not really very elucidating.[16] He states clearly that it is actually the body which lived on earth, and not some newly created house for the soul:

> Then wee shall all bee invested, reapparelled in our owne bodies; but they who have made just use of their former dayes, be superinvested with glorie, whereas the others, condemned to their olde clothes, their sinfull bodies, shall have nothing added, but immortalitie to torment.[17]

He also defines strictly the nature of its immortality:

> In Heaven we doe not say, that our bodies shall devest their mortality, so, as that naturally they could not dye; for they shall have a composition still; and every compounded thing may perish; but they shall be so assured, and with such a preservation, as they shall alwaies know they shall never dye.[18]

One of the elements in the change is its beautifying, so that

> Iezabels beauty, exalted to that height which it had by art, or higher then that. . . . shall be infinitely multiplied upon every Body.[19]

In spite of this beautifying, however, the primary conception of the body is spiritual—a paradox which it is fruitless to attempt to explain, but which Donne certainly believed. It is a real body, nevertheless it is "purer" than either angels, which are entirely spiritual, or even souls themselves as we know them on earth. The following passage from *The second Anniversarie* has already been quoted:

[14]No. 20 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VI, 273. See also Alford, *loc. cit.*
[15]*To the Countesse of Bedford* ("Honour is so sublime perfection"), 22-24.
[16]See comment by Helen Gardner ed., *John Donne, the Divine Poems* (Oxford, 1952), p. 63.
[17]*Devotions,* Expostulation XIV.
[18]No. 19 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VI, 74.
[19]No. 80 in *LXXX Sermons, loc. cit.*

Joy that their last great Consummation
Approaches in the resurrection;
When earthly bodies more celestiall
Shall be, than Angels were, for they could fall;

and this from the *Elegie on M[ist]ris Boulstred* immediately follows the lines quoted above on the marriage of soul and body:

Her Soule is gone to usher up her corse,
Which shall be almost another soule, for there
Bodies are purer, than best Soules are here.

There is even a suggestion of the Platonic in these lines from *An hymne to the Saints, and to Marquesse Hamylton* (ll. 25-30):

So sent this body that faire forme it wore,
Unto the spheare of formes, and doth (before
His soule shall fill up his sepulchrall stone,)
Anticipate a Resurrection;
For, as in his fame, now, his soule is here,
So, in the forme thereof his bodie's there.

Certainly the beautifying of the body bears no relation to sexual attractiveness. It is significant also that Donne thinks the present earthly body sufficient already to occasion the torments of hell. It was a strange humor which led Donne to preach at the Earl of Bridgewater's daughter's marriage on the text (Matthew 22:30), "For, in the resurrection, they neither marry nor are given in marriage, but are as the angels of God in heaven."[20]

In metaphorical terms, the "stubborne clay" of the body is mellowed and ripened in the grave; our "earth" becomes "gold."[21] This transformation of one substance to another appears again and again as Donne treats of this subject—often with the marked use of alchemical terminology. The grave "is the furnace, which ripens the body for the last resurrection."[22] There the body, which in one poem is laid down "christall," is transformed to "diamond."[23] The grave is the alchemist's alembic, in which "Clay" is refined

[20]No. 1 in *Fifty Sermons;* Alford, IV, 1. In the place cited in Note 19, Donne goes on to explain that the beauty the body will have is "the very beauty of Christ himselfe." See also the sermon preached at Lincoln's Inn (Alford, IV, 240), based on the text, "Flesh and blood cannot inherit the kingdom of God."

[21]*Epitaph on Himselfe,* 11-14. ". . . /Parents make us earth, and soules dignifie/ Vs to be glasse, here to grow gold we lie." Donne uses this same three-fold arrangement, in the same reference to a man in his grave — though with a less pleasant outlook — in No. 22 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 390: "When I consider what I was in my parents loynes . . . when I consider what I am now, . . . When I consider what I shall be at last, by the hand of death, in my grave. . . ."

[22]No. 19 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VI, 72.

[23]From *Elegie. Death,* 57-60:

The ravenous earth that now wooes her to be
Earth too, will be a *Lemnia;* and the tree
That wraps that christall in a wooden Tombe,
Shall be tooke up spruce, fill'd with diamond.

This allusion to the Isle of Lemnos is illuminated somewhat by one of Donne's resurrection sermons. Lemnian earth was used for medicinal purposes, and as Mr. Grierson points out, later became associated with alchemical transmutation; which must be accepted as Donne's primary intention for this illusion. In ancient times

to "Porcelane" (following the popular accounts of the manufacture of this material), and that which is already so pure as to be "Diamonds, Rubies, Saphires, Pearles, and Mines" — rather extravagant praise for the Lady Marckham, considering that in another poem the body of Christ himself is only allowed to be gold — becomes "th'Elixar of this All."[24] This use of figures from alchemy is particularly interesting in that it is an exact reversal of the process described by E. H. Duncan in explaining the origin of the alchemical teachings:

> The biblical teaching that death is a necessary preliminary to regeneration was adapted to alchemical theory and, on the basis of analogy to vegetable life, made the foundation of hypotheses regarding the natural generation as well as the artificial transmutation of metals.[25]

Another of the teachings of I Corinthians 15 is that Christ is the "first-fruits" of the dead,[26] at once the assurance of man's resurrection, and symbolic of the power which shall accomplish that miracle. So in Donne's sonnet *Ascention,* Christ is the "strong Ramme, which hast batter'd heaven for mee." The unfinished *Resurrection* poem unites the alchemical imagery with this idea of Christ as the original type of the resurrection:

> Hee was all gold when he lay downe, but rose
> All tincture, and doth not alone dispose
> Leaden and iron wills to good, but is
> Of power to make even sinfull flesh like his.

In his own burial and resurrection Christ underwent the transformation from "gold" to a "tincture" which is able in turn to transmute baser flesh into "gold."[27]

This then is Donne's answer to the *Casus in dissolutionem.* God is able not only to reconstruct the body out of the very dust into which it had decayed, but even to glorify the body, to transmute it to a spiritual body

it was known as *Lemnia sigillata.* The reference in the sermons is to No. 80 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 272. Donne is describing the dissolution of the body in death and the complete negation of all earthly glory. *"Goliah* . . . armed and fortified this body, And *Iezabel* painted and perfumed this body. . . . And they are dead. *Iezabels* dust is not Ambar, nor *Goliahs* dust *Terra sigillata,* Medicinall. . . ." This is at best only a secondary reference for the *"Lemnia"* of the *Elegie;* but it is evidence that the *Lemnia sigillata* of antiquity, with its quality of transmuting inferior substances, was the state of the body after death.

[24] *Elegie on the Lady Marckham,* 21-28. Drummond borrowed this figure from alchemy to use in his prose: see Milton A. Rugoff, "Drummond's Debt to Donne," *Philol. Quart.,* XVI (1937), 88.

[25] "Donne's Alchemical Figures," *ELH,* IX (1942), 277.

[26] See how Donne deals with this in his sermons; for instance, No. 19 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VI, 77. Also, "If the flesh of man were not to be saved, the anchor of salvation would never have taken the flesh of man upon him" (Alford, I, 250.)

[27] *Cf.* Philippians 3:21, of Christ: "Who shall change our vile body, that it may be fashioned like unto his glorious body. . . ."

which fulfills the original purposes for which the body was intended before the Fall. It is in this sense that

> . . . graves our trophies are, and both deaths' dust.[28]

Donne recognizes, of course, that not all bodies have a grave. Some are drowned in the sea, some burnt by fire, some decayed by open air, some eaten by animals or by men — these are the specific conditions which he mentions in his sermon.[29] But "though they be trod to dust in our sight, they are intire in his, because he can bid them be whole againe in an instant." Expressed poetically, these are the bodies of

> All whom the flood did, and fire shall o'erthrow.[30]

This is a part of the third fall from which we are to be restored, the *Casus in dispersionem.* Even though he seems to have answered it to his own satisfaction in his theology, the problem presented by the dispersion of bodies was strongly present. This is the sort of thing that Donne delighted in taking up and turning about to examine all its aspects and projections, as in the following passage:

> Where be all the splinters of that bone, which a shot hath shivered and scattered in the air? Where be all the atoms of that flesh, which a corrosive hath eat away, or a consumption hath breathed, and exhaled away from our arms, and other limbs? In what wrinkle, in what furrow, in what bowel of the earth, lie all the grains of the ashes of a body burnt a thousand years since? In what corner, in what ventricle of the sea, lies all the jelly of a body drowned in the general flood? what coherence, what sympathy, what dependence maintains any relation, any correspondence, between that arm which was lost in Europe, and that leg, that was lost in Africa or Asia, scores of years between? One humour of our dead body produces worms, and those worms suck and exhaust all other humour, and then all dies, and all dries, and moulders into dust, and that dust is blown into the river, and that puddled water tumbled into the sea, and that ebbs and flows in infinite revolutions

— by imposing a whole series of difficulties, each one greater than the last, Donne has heightened and intensified the problem, so as to heighten the faith and the wonder involved in his conclusion of the passage —

> and still, still God knows in what cabinet every seed-pearl lies, in what part of the world every grain of man's dust lies; . . . he beckons for the bodies of the saints, and in the twinkling of an eye, that body that was scattered over all the elements, is sat down at the right hand of God, in a glorious resurrection.[31]

Donne had so assimilated this idea of the body's dispersion that it became a perfectly natural thing to draw from it to illustrate an entirely different point, as in *The Autumnall,* where he is describing *"Winter-faces"*

[28] *Elegie on the Lady Marckham,* 34.

[29] No. 20 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VI, 274. The idea of dispersion is also seen in another sermon (Alford, IV, 235), and in the opening lines of the passage quoted from *A Funerall Elegie.*

[30] *Holy Sonnets,* VII ("At the round earths imagin'd corners"), 5.

[31] No. 1 in *Fifty Sermons;* Alford, IV, 4-5.

Whose every tooth to a severall place is gone,
To vexe their soules at Resurrection.[32]

The mere loss of limbs in various parts of the world did not deter Donne's belief; but the cycle of nature presented another problem. We die; our bodies nourish the soil from which grows the food of future generations. Or, to shorten the process and present us more directly with the difficulty,

. . . as if man feed on mans flesh, and so
Part of his body to another owe.

Even here Donne's theology is adequate, although of course he does not tell us by what process the particles of each man's body are preserved intact and identified: this surely is a realm where pure faith must operate—

Yet at the last two perfect bodies rise,
Because God knowes where every Atome lyes.[33]

"*As he puts all thy tears into his bottles* [Psalm 56:9], so he puts all the grains of thy dust into his cabinet," Donne said in one Easter sermon, "and the winds that scatter, the waters that wash them away, can carry them not out of his sight."[34]

The text of this Easter sermon was I Thessalonians 4:17, which describes the resurrection and translation of dead and living as a being "caught up." This image too appealed to Donne; he used the idea more than once. He built a very dramatic sonnet upon this picture:

At the round earths imagin'd corners, blow
Your trumpets, Angels, and arise, arise
From death, you numberlesse infinities
Of soules, and to your scattred bodies goe,
All whom the flood did, and fire shall o'erthrow,
All whom warre, dearth, age, agues, tyrannies,

[32]Donne did not raise the question of what would happen to a person's deciduous teeth. He did, however, acknowledge the constant change in the composition of the body, and refers to this at least twice in his poetry: *The second Anniversarie,* 393-400, and *Obsequies to the Lord Harrington,* 45-6. So far as I know he did not feel the necessity of reconciling this with his doctrine of the resurrection. In the Harrington elegy the two concepts appear side by side, but only as separate images and without any direct connection.

[33]*Obsequies to the Lord Harrington,* 53-56. *Cf.* this passage from Sermon No. 21 in *LXXX Sermons;* Simpson & Potter, VII, 115: "Where mans buried flesh hath brought forth grasse, and that grasse fed beasts, and those beasts fed men, and those men fed other men, God that knowes in which Boxe of his Cabinet all this seed Pearle lies, in what corner of the world every atome, every graine of every mans dust sleeps, shall recollect that dust, and then recompact that body, and then reinanimate that man, and that is the accomplishment of all." Note the use here of the same "seed Pearle" image as we have seen in the marriage sermon preached at the Earl of Bridgewater's (Note 31); and compare the reference to the Lady Marckham as "Pearle" in that elegy. The quotation which follows again uses much of the same terminology as the other two from the sermons. *Cf.* also a later poem by Montrose, in *The Oxford Book of Seventeenth Century Verse* (1934), p. 587, which borrows much of Donne's phraseology in the Harrington elegy, and Mary Paton Ramsay's comments in *A Garland for John Donne 1631-1931,* ed. Theodore Spencer (Cambridge, Mass., 1931), p. 103.

[34]No. 24 in *LXXX Sermons;* Alford, I, 475.

Despaire, law, chance, hath slaine, and you whose eyes,
Shall behold God, and never tast deaths woe. . . .[35]

Elsewhere, he said that "legions of angels, millions of angels shall be employed about the resurrection, to re-collect their scattered dust, and re-compact their ruined bodies. . . .[36] It is an impressive scene, which Donne succeeds in making nearly as vivid for us as it must have been for him. And as Donne says, "truly to lose our sense of the resurrection is as heavy a loss, as of any one point of religion."[37]

[35]*Holy Sonnets,* VII. This is a magnificent poem, in spite of its rather mixed-up theology. That "numberlesse infinities of soules" should "arise from death" is not orthodox Christianity; although Donne makes statements like this often enough to warrant comment by both Miss Gardner (pp. xliv-xlv) and Sir Herbert Grierson.

[36]No. 24 in *LXXX Sermons;* Alford, I, 479.

[37]Alford, IV, 164.

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DEVOTIONS: John Sparrow. *Devotions upon Emergent Occasions.* Cambridge, 1923.

In fairness to the reader it ought to be pointed out that the foregoing essay is intended only as introductory to a very complex subject, and does not represent any exhaustive search of others of Donne's works than those mentioned.

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TRUE ECUMENICITY—I*

JULES MARCEL NICOLE

Have you ever thought of the many sorrows which befall men on account of the fact that they are divided? Divorces, rivalries, litigations and, to crown it all, wars, together with the retinue of sufferings which follows these plagues, are all due to the fact that men are disunited. No wonder that in spite of the fact that their hopes have been disappointed again and again men are still seeking by all conceivable means to establish peace on earth.

What then shall we say of divisions among Christians? Too often the church in this respect presents a sorry sight which for many is a serious stumbling block. This problem is particularly pressing since Jesus in His sacerdotal prayer has requested so insistently that those who belong to Him might be one. How natural it is that Christians of all types should be concerned to see the supreme desire of our Lord fulfilled.

Yet we must be sure that this is truly *His* will. We intend in the present study to examine what our duty on this point may be, primarily on the basis of John 17. Occasionally we shall adduce other passages of Scripture which cast light on this subject. We intend to examine three vital questions relating to Christian unity: with whom, how and why? Each one will be the subject of a separate article.

I. Christian unity: with whom?

To this question John 17 gives a very clear answer, in fact, a two-fold answer.

A. First of all, we are not encouraged to seek unity with everybody. The sacerdotal prayer presupposes a radical distinction between believers and other men: "They are not of the world," says Jesus, "as I am not of the world" (verse 16). He does not pray for the world, but for those whom the Father has given Him (verse 9).

The word "world" can assume various meanings in the Bible. Here, unquestionably, it denotes the sum total of those who refuse to surrender to Jesus Christ, who do not want to be drawn out of their perdition to be translated into the kingdom of His dear Son. With this world in its hostility to our Savior we could not possibly seek any communion whatsoever.

Of course this does not mean that we should withdraw from the world. Jesus does not want that. We must be present in the midst of the world in order to give our testimony; more than that, we must love all men, who-

* This article first appeared in *Études Évangéliques,* August-December, 1955. It is published by permission. Roger Nicole is the translator.

ever they may be, as God Himself so loved the world that He gave His son. If we love only our brethren, we do not meet Jesus' requirements. He commands us to love even our enemies (Matt. 5:44). We must pray for all men, for this is good and acceptable in the sight of God, our Savior, who will have all men to be saved (1 Tim. 2:1-4). The apostle Paul goes so far as to say: "If it be possible, as much as lieth in you, live peaceably with all men" (Rom. 12:18). We shall do well therefore to avoid being unnecessarily aggressive. We can even go so far, it seems to me, as to support the efforts of those from whom we differ very drastically, when they undertake to fight certain social evils such as alcoholism, prostitution, slums, etc.

But it is unbiblical to overlook the fundamental difference which must exist between the disciples of Christ and the remainder of humanity. Jesus once said that He did not come to give peace on earth but rather division, even within families (Luke 12:51-53). It is contrary to His intentions to "softpedal" this division, to gather around a square or a round table representatives of all religions, intimating thereby that they differ only in degree. Christian unity according to the sacerdotal prayer can exist only in an attitude of separation from the world which has not accepted Jesus Christ and His grace.

B. This leads us to the second answer which issues from John 17. Those who must be one according to the will of the Lord are those who believe in Him through the word of the apostles: "I pray for those who shall believe in me through their word" (verse 20).

What is to believe in Christ?

It is not simply to claim Him by bearing the name of Christian. On many French products the trade-mark bears the warning: "Watch for counterfeits." Labels do not always correspond to contents. We cannot be one with those who honor Jesus with their lips, if their heart is far from Him.

To believe in Christ is not merely to have about Him a certain number of correct convictions, such as that He came into the world, that He was virgin-born, that He died on the cross, that He rose from the dead, that He shall come again. Without these, faith is not authentic, but true faith is more than a mere acceptance of evangelical truths. It is a surge of trust. When I believe in someone, that does not merely mean that I am convinced of his existence and that I have about him some accurate items of information. Rather it means that I put my trust in him.

To believe in Jesus is to surrender to Him, to count no more on self but on Him for this life and for eternity. It is to accept the grace which

comes forth from the cross; it is to be transformed by a living contact with Him: "He that believeth on me," says He, "hath everlasting life" (John 6:47). It is those who have gone through this profound existence, implying the forgiveness of sin and the entrance into a new life, and those only, whom the Lord wishes to unite together.

We should not forget the important little phrase "those who shall believe *through their word.*" This is to say, through the word of the Apostles. It is the Apostles' word, the New Testament, which constitutes our authority to know Christ. Those who want to come to Jesus by some other means than Holy Scripture, or who venture to cut off something, be it ever so small, of the Apostolic witness are in danger of erring at the whim of their own fancy. Instead of holding fast to our Lord as He is, they shall have more or less corrective views about Him; that is to say, more or less false views!

Therefore, fruitful Christian unity can only manifest itself in an atmosphere of absolute respect for the Bible. Where human traditions displace the Scripture, where human authorities claim the right to tear off pages from the sacred text, there could not exist such unity as our Lord desires.

If now we consider the actual life situation, a question arises: these people who believe in Christ according to the Apostles' word, where are they? They belong to the most diverse churches, some ritualistic, others popular; some applying a very strict discipline, others being satisfied with a very loose discipline. These are believers in established churches and in the conventicles of dissenters.

If there were one church made up exclusively of people who believe in Christ through the Apostles' word, and including all of these, the situation would be clear. Such a church does not exist on earth. One can and one should aim to have a church which comprises only true believers. Yet, in fact, no community however rigorous its discipline may be, may boast of having reached this ideal. Hypocrites or superficial Christians can always filter in. At best there are only churches in which all members *profess* to believe in Christ.

Furthermore, no church has the right to claim to be the only true church, as long as outside of her so many people believe in Christ through the word of the Apostles. Surely, "the Lord knoweth them that are His" (2 Tim. 2:19). As for us, we notice only what strikes the eye. We do not know what transpires in the heart. Our insight is open to question.

Under those circumstances, we should tend to unite with all those who have the *appearance* of believing in Christ, exercising what the ancient theologians used to call the *judgment of charity.* That means that

we should give trust to those who profess to cling to Christ, unless we have solid grounds to doubt their word.

Evidently if someone does not confess Jesus Christ come in the flesh, we cannot in the name of the judgment of charity maintain our trust in him and feel at one with him. We are in duty bound to separate from him. The Apostle John, whom no one shall accuse of having insufficiently grasped love's rights, enjoins us not to receive him into our house, and not to bid him God speed (2 John 10). No doubt a strictly literal interpretation would not do justice to this text, but the least that can be said is that it commands us to avoid all that could be construed as an approval of heretics or as the mark of fellowship with them.

Similarly, when a man overtly breaks God's commandments, when he lives in open rebellion, we cannot in good conscience acknowledge him as a Christian and we are obliged to obey the order of St. Paul: "Put away from among yourselves that wicked person" (1 Cor. 5:13).

But outside of these two cases: denial of the Christian truth and manifest departure from Christian ethics, the judgment of charity should be exercised. And perhaps it might be preferable to be too hospitable rather than not enough. If there be doubt, let us rather incur the risk of being gracious to a wolf rather than that of rebuffing a sheep!

Thus far we have spoken of the union of believers on the personal level, and we have hardly touched upon the problem of the union of churches. This is not without grounds. For the sacerdotal prayer envisions the relationship of Christians between themselves individually, and does not deal with ecclesiastical questions. We would like, nevertheless, to say a few words on this subject.

And first of all, we desire to state that one can very well be one with a brother from another church without thereby endorsing everything in that church. When a man gets married, he is pleased to have good relations with the family of his wife, but after all he did not get married to her whole family! Provided that husband and wife are well united, the home is happy. Thus I can fraternize without reservation with a brother who believes in Christ through the Apostles' word, without being obliged thereby to adopt the same attitude toward all his coreligionists, if these do not have the same faith as he.

When the subject of relations between various churches is broached, wisdom as well as loyalty to the Lord compel us to act upon the basis which we have just defined according to John 17. A fruitful unity can exist only between churches which confess faith in Christ according to the word of the Apostles. To seek unity on another basis is to go astray; it is to move toward the opposite of what Jesus asked of the Father.

Perhaps some will think that this presentation is rather negative. They might object that I have shown with whom we should not be united, rather than outlined the conditions within which union is a duty.

In closing I would like therefore to emphasize how wonderful is the unity of believers. What a marvelous feeling it is to be one with brethren, in spite of differences in temperament, in race, in social standing, in education; in spite even of differing views on some doctrine which does not relate directly to the person of Christ or to the authority of the Bible. How pleasing it is to fraternize above what men call ecclesiastical barriers, and to realize that these barriers are far from being as high or as thick as is often supposed. This type of unity is one of the chief blessings enjoyed in Christian conferences. It has filled our hearts with joy in the spring of 1955, in our work of preparation for Billy Graham's campaign in Paris. The same may be said for the campaign itself. We were there, men tied to many groups and in no wise desirous of leaving them, yet all united around the person of the Savior in an atmosphere of respect for His Word.

"Behold, how good and how pleasant it is for brethren to dwell together in unity" (Psa. 133:1). Perhaps there is among our readers some lonely forlorn soul. There are so many in the world. How I wish that you could believe in Jesus Christ, through the written word, and henceforth united to Him, taste the sweet fellowship of those of like faith.

PERSONALIA

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The Biology of the Spirit, by Edmund W. Sinnott. New York: Viking Press, 1955. $3.50.

A review in *Time* led to the reading of this book by the dean of the Graduate School of Yale University. Reading amply justified expectations. Its language is simple, but not deceptively so, for the author is a master of English prose as well as adept in expressing scientific and philosophical ideas in nontechnical terms. Moreover, the book is carefully reasoned, each chapter being provided with an abstract, as exactingly phrased as in the legal usage of that word.

Dr. Sinnott states his case with modesty, despite the august implications of his thesis. His conclusions are tantalizingly vague, his hints of their implications too indefinite to be called hypotheses. The reader with a particular bias, scientific, philosophical, artistic, or theological, is tempted to jump from Dr. Sinnott's carefully guarded statements to brightly gleaming, sharply outlined, but nevertheless nebulously buttressed, conclusions. It is clear that the hopeful Yale dean would welcome advance from his cautiously tentative position to more sharply definable bastions in the various domains of thought, but he would have us make sure that those bastions are defensible, if not impregnable, before we commit our spiritual forces to them. The stimulating quality of the book is spiced with sharp, unresolved discords of warning.

The merit of the book is not chiefly in novelty of ideas — they have indeed been suggested from Empedocles and Lao-tze down to current popularizers of evolutionary mythology such as Jacquetta Hawkes — but in the clarity and balance of their expression.

Dean Sinnott insists that his book is a biologist's book of biology, though admittedly "in the widest sense." "A biologist looks at life," would be a not inept subtitle. The first chapter deals with the perennial debate regarding the relation of man's body to his spirit and the impasse presented by modern materialistic biology which would reduce all to biological chemistry with no room for spirit as other than illusion. Dr. Sinnott seeks "to find in the facts of biology itself a common foundation for both mind and body. This," he says, "will make it possible to interpret them as parts of the underlying unity of life" (3).

Chapter two states and illustrates the fact that all life tends to the development of "a precisely formed body and not a formless mass" (13). It develops as if toward a "goal." If normal development is interfered with, the organism tends to restore lost parts and to reach its goal. A measure of restorative ability seems to be immanent in all its parts. This goal-seeking

is illustrated by examples from various biological realms, from pine tree to embryo.

In the third chapter, on "Protoplasm and Purposes," the suggestion is offered that "this tendency toward goal-seeking manifest in the activities of both body and mind, is a basic characteristic of *all* life, and that life is thus inherently goal-directed and purposeful" (49). Philosophical objections to this apparent (in the author's view, only apparent) introduction of a final cause into biology are considered. But after all, "there is always the possibility that 'final' causes actually *may* be operative in nature and that a purpose in the mind may have a direct effect on physical events" (67).

The chapter, "Of Men and Motives," objects that "goals" is a better term than "drives" for that which produces the behavior of organisms. So we reach "the Philosophy of Goals," wherein we find the unity of the life of body and spirit. "Goal-seeking [is] life's most characteristic quality. About it center the great problems of biology and philosophy" (102). Mechanistic determinism has a limited value for investigative purposes, but is not of ultimate validity. "The philosopher, the poet, the artist, and the mystic should all contribute of their insights here, for all are concerned with life. The constellation of man's deepest problems centers in biology, but in a biology broadened and illuminated by contact with our widest horizons" (120).

So we come to the final chapter, "The Biology of the Spirit." "The greatest importance of the concept here presented is in its bearing on the problems of religion. If man's mind has a biological basis, his *spirit* must have one also. 'Spirit' is defined as those spontaneous urgencies and desires, the basis of the emotions, which are the highest expressions of biological goal-seeking. This idea will seem inadequate to men of faith, but it provides a scientific interpretation for what otherwise is a nebulous concept" (121). Thence we proceed to values, notably beauty and goodness, which are absolutes in the form-seeking of life. So we are prepared to accept the reality of the human soul, defined in words Dr. Sinnott quotes from Edmund Spenser:

> "For of the soule the bodie form doth take:
> For soule is forme, and doth the bodie make."

Plato is not mentioned, but is not this the essence of Platonism, and yet not inconsistent with the (Thomistic) Aristotelianism of the Final Cause; in Dante's phrase, "The love that moves the sun and the other stars?" Though the dean does speak once in passing of "God as a Principle of Organization" (164), yet his careful statement in regard to the "Principle of Organization which, through life, brings order out of chaos, spirit out of

matter, and personality out of impersonal stuff," is: "This principle we may identify as an attribute of God" (122). Again, "This Principle of Organization, lifted far above its expression in matter and into the realm of spirit, may without irreverence, I believe, be thought of as an attribute of God" (162).

The tendency of inorganic nature, following the Second Law of Thermodynamics, is toward increasing randomness, disorganization, while there is in life that which seeks form and goal. Through all the universe these two principles, death and life, engage, and biologically the triumph of life and purpose seems assured by the superior resourcefulness of creativeness over entropy.

A noteworthy insight of Dean Sinnott is that "the hardest blow that Darwin struck at faith was not the proof that man had come from beasts but the assumption that the whole evolutionary process depends finally on variations that arise by chance. A living organism, however, is not a chance creation but a well-regulated system. It draws random matter in and endows it with order and directiveness" (161, 162).

The book reviewed does not constitute an evangelical philosophy, but it has dug away the debris and cleared a neat cellar-hole in which an evangelical may erect the foundation for a philosophy of such stability as shall weather the hurricanes of twentieth-century thought. There is purpose in life, rooted in the Spirit whence the human spirit comes, the Spirit of Him in whom all things consist.

—*Emmet Russell*

Calvinism, by Benjamin A. Warburton. Grand Rapids: Wm. B. Eerdmans Pub. Co., 1955. 248 pp. $3.00.

Few subjects in the history of the church have raised such frequent smoke and infrequent fire as that of this book. Yet no theologian can evade its issues nor can any philosopher claim coherence without due cognizance of its problems. Surely the intelligent Christian must then examine his position in the light of its challenges that he may detect essayed evasion or inadvertent incoherence and escape the ensuing snares. To this end the English writer, Warburton, gives us one of the finest and most readable recent accounts of the origin, growth, and practical import of this lifeblood of the Reformed tradition. There is now little need to appear unlettered on so fundamental a question.

It is highly probable that the author is correct when he maintains that there are only two great systems of Christian theology, those rooted in Calvinism or those in Arminianism. True, the systems given these names are fairly modern, but the foundations lie deep in a dichotomy as early as the

Apostolic church. On the one pole is the sovereignty of God, on the other the self-determination of man. The antithesis is not evaded by the aid of other religions which cannot understand the first pole nor by the shelter of 'secular' philosophies with their premises and methods founded in the second. Resolution lies only in the totality of Scripture to which both Calvinism and Arminianism lay their claims. It is the aim of this book to show that only the former is the rightful heir.

Through a very succinct study of the debate during the history of the church and its resolution in the church councils and the creeds of the great historical denominations, it appears that Warburton has achieved this aim. For the practical critic, his chapters on Calvinism in the inner life and on the fruits of Calvinism are masterful presentations of the workability of the thesis in the life of the believer. The famous five points, so little understood, need be so no more. Whether or not understanding brings assent, this book must take its place with Berkouwer, Boettner, and a number of other works by modern authors as a real challenge to that end.

—*Thomas H. Leith*

Surprised by Joy, by C. S. Lewis. New York: Harcourt Brace and Co., 1955. 238 pp. $3.50.

This book might be described as C. S. Lewis' spiritual biography. Lewis himself describes it as presenting the shape of his early life. It goes, of course, beyond this but always in terms of this fundamental reference. His conversion, for example, is as much as anything else looked upon as the culmination of God's providential working — though much more descriptive personal terms are used (cf. "My Adversary began to make His final moves"). The title is particularly appropriate. It can be interpreted correctly in a multitude of ways, for Lewis' concept of joy is a deep and rich one. Basically, joy is "unsatisfied desire which is itself more desirable than any other satisfaction" (17-18).

Much of this volume is typical of Lewis' other religious writings. He is characteristically careful to point out that he was not brought up in Puritanism and not thus conditioned to Christianity. Clever observations and canny insights abound: "It is not settled happiness but momentary joy that glorifies the past" (8). The imaginative powers of Lewis are particularly to the fore. He relates these to what would be described theologically in terms of providence and common grace: "I do not think that the resemblance between the Christian and the purely imaginative experience is accidental. I think that all things, in their way, reflect heavenly truth, the imagination not the least" (167). This perspective is, to a great extent, the key to the organization of the book and to Lewis' interpretation of his life.

In the very last portions of this spiritual autobiography, there is revealed the philosophic path through which God led him to Christ. To begin with he observes that the giving up of metaphysical Realism moved him toward Idealism and Theism (208) [those evangelical Christians who defend realism as the only Christian philosophy please take note!]. He was forced to "admit that mind was no late-come epiphenomenon; that the whole universe was, in the last resort, mental; that our logic was participation in a cosmic Logos" (208-9). However, this step, by itself, was not enough; in fact, it merely "enabled one to get all the conveniences of Theism, without believing in God" (209). "This was a religion that cost nothing . . . [But,] I should be very sorry not to have passed through that experience. I think it is more religious than many experiences that have been called Christian. What I learned from the idealists (and still most strongly hold) is this maxim: it is more important that Heaven should exist than that any of us should reach it" (210-11). This is certainly a high insight. Too many devoted Christians never quite appreciate that the humanism that is always determined to *use* God ought to be left *completely* behind. Lewis put it this way: "God was to be obeyed simply because He was God" (231).

So it was when he had found the God for whom and by whom he was made, he realized that "all the value lay in that of which joy was the desiring" (220). Now, "we shall not stop and stare, or not much; not on this road . . . 'We would be in Jerusalem'" (238).

—*Lloyd F. Dean*

Israel and the New Covenant, by Roderick Campbell. Philadelphia: Presbyterian and Reformed Publishing Co., 1954. xiii + 336 pp. $3.75.

What is the "cause of the frustration of the Christian world when confronted with the social, industrial and political confusion of the time?" This is the vital theme of this book by a scholarly Canadian businessman, Roderick Campbell. His answer is clearly and at times eloquently set forth as the failure of the Christian Church to realize in its own life the truth and power of the New Covenant. As stated in brief in the Foreword by Oswald Allis, "The Christian church has for centuries failed to take seriously and carry out fully the Great Commission." Mr. Campbell's grasp of Scripture and his felicitous talent for grouping a series of Bible passages together to develop an aspect of the truth make the book a delight to read. He is at his best and most moving when he deals with the responsibilities of the believer under the "new and better covenant." He has a remarkable acquaintance with the literature of the Reformed tradition, especially the English Puritans, and one of the most appreciated parts of the book is the liberal

use of quotations from these saints of the past. The book will enrich and bless the spiritual life of any reader.

Having expressed our appreciation of Mr. Campbell's work, we must also indicate what we feel to be its weaknesses. This is as fine a popular presentation of postmillennial eschatology as we know, and we honor the consistency with which the author holds his position. In doing so, however, he commits errors that all writers on doctrinal themes should carefully guard against. The greatest weakness is his failure to appreciate or attempt to meet the strength of other eschatological positions. His reading, though deep, seems very narrow. There is very little recognition of the great Anglican and Lutheran authors. His attitude seems to be that the only serious or important scholars are those who hold his own views.

In his exegesis of critical passages, Mr. Campbell often ignores problems of time. The outstanding example of this is his confusing or blending the present and future aspects of the Kingdom. He holds the position that all prophecy must be fulfilled in the present Christian era or never (p. 109). Prophecy that might conceivably refer to a future "millennial" period is ruled out for then the prophetic writer would have nothing to say to us (p. 117). He contends also that only with this postmillennial view is there any real impetus for missions or indeed for victorious Christian living. This ignores the historical fact that postmillennialism has been the least missionary-minded of all the eschatologies held by evangelical Christians.

The most admirable thing about the book is the spirit in which it is written. There is a complete lack of the bitterness that mars so many otherwise good books. The firmly held convictions are set forth in an earnest Christian love that speaks of the "wisdom that cometh from above."

—*Philip C. Johnson*

The Small Sects in America, by Elmer T. Clark. Nashville: Abingdon-Cokesbury Press, 1949. Rev. ed. 256 pp. $3.00.

The Religious Bodies of America, by F. E. Mayer. St. Louis: Concordia Publishing House, 1956. 2nd ed. 591 pp. $8.50.

These two books serve as fine complements to each other. The main thrust of Clark is to analyze the historical, theological, and psychological backgrounds of the "little religious bodies" of Protestant America, whereas Mayer's effort is directed mainly to a similar analysis of the larger religious groups.

Mr. Clark agrees with Niebuhr's definition of a sect as a "voluntary association," the seed or kernel which progressively becomes a church and a denomination. The author is willing to concede that the small sects have

a place (perhaps small) in American religious life. He holds that the sect has "a strong attachment to certain definite or concrete ear-marks of its own." It is these ear-marks that he is interested in presenting. Mayer also stresses distinctives, but in addition seeks to show many of the common features of the different groups by treating their European or American backgrounds. Mayer's chapters are arranged according to theological positions: the Holy Catholic Apostolic Church, Lutherans, Arminians, Reformed Churches, Millennial Groups, etc. Mr. Clark's sects are divided into seven categories: 1) the Pessimistic or Adventist, 2) The Perfectionist or Subjective, 3) the Charismatic or Pentecostal, 4) the Communistic, 5) Legalist or Objectivist, 6) the Egocentric or New Thought, 7) the Esoteric or Mystic. The latter two groups are relegated to brief appendices. On the basis of theological distinctives or numbers, it is rather strange to find that Clark devotes only five lines to Christian Science and four lines to Unity (Appendix A) and that Mayer devotes two pages to the American Baptists in comparison to the much larger Southern Baptists who rate only half a page.

Clark attempts with doubtful success to maintain "an unprejudiced and sympathetic, attitude." After using this book, one is led to believe that the author may not be too unbiased, but better fulfills his prefatory statement that "in the small sects one sees religion as it springs naturally from the naive and simple heart . . ." This attitude is reflected in the suggested characteristics of the sects: Refugees of the Poor, Emotionally Starved, Puritan Morality, Craving for Objectivity, and Conservative. The assumption seems to be that these are undesirable or negative traits. Most sects are either ignorant or "unaffected by . . . the scientific leanings of a sophisticated society." In the light of this statement, this reviewer feels it is highly significant that Mr. Clark closes his work with a plea for religious education. Not only are the sects "confused as to the philosophy of religious education" but "instruction in the Bible seems to be the main objective." Clark's goal coincides with that of the "great Protestant bodies" namely, "a well-developed and scientifically-based system of religious education." One might agree with Clark as to the necessity of education, but one should ask a system founded upon what? Man's relative religious instincts or an absolute Biblical revelation?

Dr. Mayer makes no claim to an objective attitude (note the stress upon Lutheranism) and yet one senses that he has tried to present fairly all views (e.g. Millennialism), that this theology is decidedly conservative, and that his appeal is to a Biblical revelation.

Both books are recent revisions of earlier editions (Clark's of 1937, Mayer's of 1953), both are well bound, contain excellent bibliographical

references, have adequate indexes, and should be in the library of every Christian college and Biblical student.

—*C. Milburn Keen, Jr.*

SURVEY OF SIGNIFICANT ARTICLES

THOMAS H. LEITH

Annals of the American Academy of Political and Social Science, March. An issue on racial desegregation and integration.

American Historical Review, January, C. R. Lovell, "Afrikaner Nationalism and Apartheid."

American Scholar, Winter, essays by Fromm, Krutch, Lerner, Reinhold Niebuhr and others on the human situation today. The Spring number has an article on the place of thought in American life by Boorstin.

Anglican Theological Review, January. Contains articles on Kierkegaard and existential theology.

Asbury Seminarian, Winter. A series on the church and Christian education with special emphasis on Wesleyan theology.

Atlantic Monthly, February, Vannevar Bush, "Can Men Live Without War?" The April issue has an article on the angry south and one by Averell Harriman on "The Soviet Challenge and American Policy."

Journal of Biblical Literature, March, C. C. McCown, "The Current Plight of Biblical Scholarship."

Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, March, W. R. Frye, "The Disarmament Dilemma."

Australasian Journal of Philosophy, December, D. H. Monro, "Anthropology and Ethics" and R. N. Smart, "The Perfect Good."

Behavioral Science, January. The first issue of this new journal contains an article by R. W. Gerard, Clyde Kluckhohn, and Anatol Rapoport on "Biological and Cultural Evolution: Some Analogies and Explorations." Also, "Communications and Social Change" by R. L. Muir.

Bible Translator, January. Contains a list of commentaries on the Epistles and Revelation.

Bibliothecra Sacra, January, M. F. Unger, "The Significance for Biblical Studies of the New Manuscript Finds" and S. J. Schultz, "The Unity of the Race."

British Journal for the Philosophy of Science, February, N. Walker, "The Definition of Psychosomatic Disorder."

Catholic Biblical Quarterly, January. Contains a lengthy and very fine survey of periodical articles for 1955.

Christian Graduate, March, D. M. Mackey, "Need Human Choice Imply Physical Indeterminateness?" and A. M. Stibbs, "Miracles as Signs."

Christian Life, January, "The Development of Life"—a collection of opinions. There is a fine discussion in the March issue on "Is Evangelical Theology Changing?"

Christian Scholar, March, E. LaB. Cherbonnier, "Mystical versus Biblical Symbolism," W. Harrelson, "Creation," and G. E. Wright, "Progressive Revelation."

Current History. The February and April issues report on India and Germany respectively. The March issue deals with American Foreign Policy.

Diogenes, Number 12, J. W. Yolton, "Individuality, Leadership, and Democracy."

Ecumenical Review, January, R. S. Bilheimer, "Theological Aspects of Rapid Social Change."

Études Évangéliques, August-December, E. G. Leonard, "La religion de Dante" and J. M. Nicole, "L'unité chrétienne."

Evangelical Quarterly, January-March, W. Stanford Reid, "The Psychology of Conversion."

Evolution, March, N. D. Newell, "Catastrophism and the Fossil Record."

Foreign Affairs, April, H. A. Kissinger, "Force and Diplomacy in the Nuclear Age."

Jewish Quarterly Review, January. Contains a lengthy presentation of Zeitlin's controversial views on the Dead Sea Scrolls.

Nation, March 3. A discussion of the new Soviet challenge to the West. The March 10 number contains a discussion entitled, "Does the Death Sentence Prevent Crime?"

New Republic, April 9. A symposium on the Dead Sea Scrolls and their significance.

Philosophy of Science, January, A. C. Danto, "On Explanations in History" and Gene Weltfish, "The Perspective for Fundamental Research in Anthropology."

Practical Anthropology, January-February, an editorial "Reflections on the Auca Tragedy."

Reformed Journal, February, D. H. Bouma, "The Church and Current Social Trends." The March issue has articles by L. J. Flokstra on "Effective College Teaching" and by D. W. Jellema on "Genesis, Science, John Calvin."

Journal of Religion, January, A. B. Gibson, "Empirical Evidence and Religious Faith."

Religion in Life, Spring. A symposium on Spiritual Healing.

Journal of Religious Thought, Autumn-Winter. Contains articles on the unity of the Bible, principles of Biblical interpretation, and contemporary Protestant theology and the Bible.

Review of Metaphysics, March. The idea of creation is discussed.

Review of Religion, March, W. W. Paul, "Faith and Reason in Kierkegaard and Modern Existentialism."

Saturday Review, March 3. Several articles on the problems of the Dead Sea scrolls. The March 24 number contains a symposium, "Where is Science Taking Us?"

Science and Society, Winter, I. L. Horowitz, "The New Conservatism" and E. Kaiser, "The Federal Government and the Negro, 1865-1955."

Scientific American, March. An article on the crisis of increased world population by Julian Huxley.

Scientific Monthly, March, H. Dingle, "History of Science and the Sociology of Science" and J. Cockcroft, "Future of Atomic Energy."

Scottish Journal of Theology, March, J. Macmurray, "Prolegomena to a Christian Ethic."

Teachers College Record, March, F. H. Horn, "Problems Facing Higher Education" and F. E. Johnson, "Religion and Education."

Theology Today, January, G. A. Barrows, "The Rise of Marian Theology."

Torch and Trumpet, February, E. Heerema, "Psychology and the Bible."

Union Seminary Quarterly Review, January, A. J. Toynbee, "Christianity and non-Christian Faiths."

Transactions of the Victoria Institute, January 16, H. L. Ellison, "Some Major Trends in Old Testament Study."

Westminster Theological Journal, November, P. E. Hughes, "Evolutionary Dogma and Christian Theology."

World Dominion, November-December. A discussion of the relation of the church to adult education and to industry. The latter subject is continued in the January-February issue in which there is also a discussion of religious liberty in Latin America.